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Karen E. Till
Walls are symbolic and material manifestations of political
boundaries. This Intervention builds upon recent work in political
geography that considers borders as sovereign sites of security aswell
as mobile places of encounter (Johnson et al., 2011; Jones, 2012;
Mountz, 2011). Walls may fulfill divisive state agendas through
“conflict infrastructures” as Wendy Pullan describes in her Interven-
tion; at the same time theymay be used by borderland inhabitants to
create “infrastructures of peace” as Charis Psaltis, Chara Makriyianni,
Rana Zincir Celal, and Meltem Onurkan Samani argue. Through our
focus onwalls, we pay attention to new forms of state power, such as
“resurgent sovereignty” (Butler, 2006), but also to what Lorraine
Dowler describes as “place-based sovereigns” and their embodied
practices, such as acts of witnessing that Juanita Sundberg portrays.
Walls “are historically contingent and characterized by contex-
tual features and power relations” (Paasi, 2011, p. 62). In past and: þ353 1 708 3573.
All rights reserved.this state surveillance system e maintained through minefields,
watchtowers, walls, “no man’s lands”, and checkpoints e ran
124 miles around three western sectors, and between East and
West Berlin. This material infrastructure was a symbol of the
communist “security blanket”, identifying political differences
between an “us” and “them”, an East Bloc and West Bloc.
As state wall building has become more, rather than less,
pronounced following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, scholars
have revisited literatures on borders, walls, and state power at
multiple scales (Kaplan & Häkli, 2002; Silberman, Till, & Ward,
2012). Brown (2010) understands “new” walls as indicative of an
era of post-Westphalian “waning sovereignty”. Although walls still
historic counterparts, for Brown new walls are a state response to
“the ungovernability by law and politics of many powers unleashed
by globalization and late modern colonialization” (p. 24). The new
global landscape of blockading is evidence of state-perceived
threats from the transnational flows of the “political economy
and religiously legitimated violence” (p. 23) that “lack political
form or organization” and have no clear “subjective and coordi-
nated intentionality” (p. 24). Brown argues that the new walls
demonstrate that state borders are blurred, and divisions between
“us” and “them” are no longer clear.
While the conflation of military, police, and civilian surveillance
border tactics do indicate a change in the nature of state sover-
eignty, state borders have long been selectively porous. Does this
“new” global landscape of walled states and cities indicate a “loss”
of sovereignty in response to globalization as Brown argues?
Butler’s (2006) arguments about “resurgent sovereignty” offer
a different understanding regarding the changing nature of state
power and borders in recent years. Resurgent sovereignty is
a strategy of governmentality that suspends and deploys the law
“tactically and partially to suit the requirements of a state that seeks
more and more to allocate sovereign power to its executive and
administrative powers” (p. 55). Drawing upon Agamben, Butler
notes that the sovereign exception, as an exercise of prerogative
power, is used to limit the jurisdiction of law within and beyond
state borders. Resurgent sovereignty seeks “to neutralize the rule of
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to suspend the law and disregard international accords, it extends
its power to decide what humans are no longer eligible for basic
human rights (including the right to life) in the spaces and times of
its own choosing. The state of exception, now the norm, becomes
the space-times of exception. While extra-territoriality is not new,
Butler argues that the mechanisms used by the state to restructure
“temporality itself” are novel: the “problem of terrorism is no
longer a historically or geographically limited problem” (pp. 64e
65). Further, resurgent sovereignty indicates a state desire
“animated by an aggressive nostalgia that seeks to do awaywith the
separation of powers” (p. 61).
The building of newwalls and their effects can be understood as
technologies of resurgent sovereignty. First, the suspension of the
law to manage populations moves through the intra-territorial
pathways of wall infrastructures. As Sundberg describes in her
Intervention, a new type of U.S.eMexico border region has been
created that justifies the retrenchment of existing civil rights,
a process that she describes as “walling up democracy”. The
authority given to the Department of Homeland Security by the U.S.
Congress to waive existing laws e in order to prevent “terrorists”
from traveling and “bolster” state border security e has produced
a “constitution-free zone” within and beyond the U.S.eMexico
border. Her Intervention demonstrates how the wall works to
produce a new kind of “zone of exception” within a state to deny its
own citizens basic rights.
Second, wall “conflict infrastructures” work through the space-
times of “strategic confusion” as Pullan describes for Israele
Palestine in her Intervention. The wall’s political infrastructures
date back to the period just following the 1967 war. They now
tactically connect Israeli neighborhoods through settlement and
transportation planning. Pullan argues that the spatial depth
associated with strategic anti-/planning ensures that even if the
wall were removed division would remain. A related process of
“infradestructure” (Azoulay, 2011) has resulted in the destruction of
Palestinian schools, hospitals, homes, and neighborhoods in the
name of “national security”.
The space-times of conflict infrastructure mean that even when
border crossings in divided states become possible, facilitating
contact across borders, and creating shared narratives and spaces
remain pressing challenges. As Psaltis et al.’s Intervention
describes, years after some checkpoints opened up along the Green
Line in Nicosia in 2003, most residents continued to live in separate
social spaces. In such a divided context, the establishment of
a bicommunal Home for Co-operation (H4C) in 2011 has created
a new “infrastructure for peace”. Through “transformative knowl-
edge”, civil society transnational networks, and the material
possibilities enabled through the borderlands, the H4C offers a safe
space of encounter because of its “neutral” location in a demilita-
rized zone. In a system of states of exception, this model of an
alternative “third space”, created by and producing new episte-
mologies, meshworks and social imaginaries, also illustrates “a life
in potentiality, a surprising and unanticipated life that has capacity
to interrupt the border line” (Amoore, 2011, p. 64).
According to Jones (2012), while people may accept the exis-
tence of state borders, “at other times they continue to think and
live in alternative configurations that maintain connections across,
through, and around sovereign state territoriality” (p. 697). Dow-
ler’s Intervention about the historical and living actors in Belfast
offers a rich set of examples of what Jones calls “spaces of refusal”,
including a local neighborhood “people’s festival”, feminist peace
demonstrations, and political tourism practices. “Place-based
sovereigns” can be locals, residents, or even tourists; they reject,
ignore, or rework the behaviors required by states to create “doors”
in physical boundaries intended to be solid. Their bodies,movements, and stories work beyond and through walls to enable
scholars to see the possibilities of cohabitation rather than of
division only.
Whereas physical walls may be the most obvious symbols of
conflict infrastructures, these Interventions attempt to make the
other space-times of walls more visible. Sundberg’s emphasis on
witnessing offers new understandings of how democracies create
exclusionary zones of exception that ‘wall up’ civil rights and rights
to shared environments. Pullan’s map (Fig. 4) brings to view other-
wise known, but not often visible, wall infrastructures that divide
cities and peoples and may ultimately last even longer than
a material boundary. At the same time, the legacies of division,
including “no man’s lands” and abandoned structures, may be used
to create “infrastructures of peace” that may connect residents years
after physical violence subsides as Psaltis et al. discuss below. Finally,
as Dowler’s Intervention highlights, because new and old doorsmay
be kept open in walls by place-based sovereigns, these lived prac-
tices offer a different perspective into the ways that borders move.
Delimiting democracy: witnessing along the USeMexico
borderlands
Juanita Sundberg
In 2006, former U.S. President GeorgeW. Bush signed the Secure
Fence Act,mandating the construction of 850-miles of fencing along
the 1954-mile boundary dividing the U.S. from Mexico. The vocif-
erous and active opposition to the construction of border walls in
south Texas drewme to the Lower Rio Grande Valleye homeland of
border studies scholar Gloria Anzaldúae in the hot summermonths
of 2008. Together with members of No Border Wall, a grassroots
coalition organized to articulate dissent in the valley, I set out to
witness the implementation of the Secure Fence Act. Though
initially drawn by debates about identity and national security
prominent in border studies (Ackleson, 1999; Kaplan & Häkli, 2002;
Meinhof, 2002; Paasi, 1996), bearing witness to the daily, place-
based practices involved in walling the border revealed profound
concerns about democratic process. I argue that wall building in the
southernU.S. is implicated inwalling up democracy. The suspension
of law at the edges of the nation’s territory has numerous implica-
tions that have yet to be fully considered by political geographers.
I make this argument at a moment of renewed interest in
sovereignty, in part spurred by studies inspired by Agamben’s work
on sovereign power and state violence (Gregory, 2006; Jones,
2009). While Brown (2010) suggests that the proliferation of
border walls around the world indicates the waning of state
sovereignty in the face of globalization and powerful non-state
actors, other scholars emphasize the continuing and, indeed,
increasing power of states to draw boundaries between inside and
outside, legal and illegal, as well as “politically qualified life and
merely existent life” (Gregory, 2006, p. 406). While much of this
literature has focused on the U.S. government’s so-called war on
terror (Butler, 2006; Gregory, 2009), I draw attention to legislation
that produces the U.S. borderlands as a space of exception in the
name of building border infrastructure. By weaving together
narratives drawn from witnessing the construction of the border
wall in the Rio Grande Valley, I capture the daily excursions of No
BorderWall activists to document the progress of construction. The
concept of witnessing honors Anzaldúa’s (1987) evocative and
deeply personal writing about identity and life in the borderlands.
No Border Wall witnessing practices are meant to inform
a geographically distanced public about the actual practices of wall
building; I further their practice by suggesting that the judicial and
legislative processes meant to protect citizens are instead used
strategically to wall up democracy.
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Secure Fence Act of 2006 identified three priority areas in Texas
where at “least two layers of reinforced fencing” should be built.
South Texans immediately organized to contest the wall and its
underlying supposition that the Río Bravo/Rio Grande River forms
a boundary between different peoples (No Border Wall, n.d.). “The
river is what connects, not divides us” was a refrain I heard
repeatedly in city council meetings, protests, and individual inter-
views. “No wall between amigos” was another (Fig. 1).
The Texas Border Coalition, a group of mayors, county judges,
and business leaders from El Paso to Brownsville openly opposed
what Laredo’s then mayor called the “wall of shame” (McLemore,
2007). In a 2008 city commissioners’ debate about a proposed
border wall on the southern banks of the river in Brownsville,
Mayor Ahumada told a packed city hall he was very proud of his bi-
national heritage and would be unable to choose between his
Mexican-born mother or American-born father: “I couldn’t make
that decision and nobody should have to,” he said.
At a 2008 congressional field hearing in Brownsville, valley
residents conveyed their fears about how a border wall would
destroy their bi-national way of life. A local landowner and activist
told officials: “It isn’t really a border to most of us who live down
here” (cited in Sieff, 2008). Angered by her comments, Colorado
Congressman Tom Tancredo criticized what he called landowners’
“multiculturalist attitude toward borders”, suggesting: “If you don’t
like the idea (of a fence), maybe you should consider building the
fence around the northern part of your city” (Ibid). Tancredo’s
statement is a performance of walling: he suggests that predomi-
nantly Latino/a south Texas communities do not belong to the
nation and therefore should be physically relocated outside
national territory. But Tancredo also is saying that dissent threatens
the nation-state and dissenters should be walled off.
These moments demonstrate the importance of bi-national
identifications for valley residents and resonate with existing
research on boundaries as points of connection as well as division
(Newman, 2006). And yet Tancredo’s sinister comments also draw
attention to the ways in which the construction of U.S. border walls
serves to demarcate exclusion and delimit democratic process.
Wall building also proceeds by waiving the law. In meetings
with U.S. Department of Homeland Security (USDHS) Secretary
Michael Chertoff in early 2007, Texas leaders were told they would
be consulted if and when any fencing was planned for the TexasFig. 1. The Río Bravo/Rio Grande river as a symbol of unity not division: No Border Wall
protest, Texas, 2008. Photo by Juanita Sundberg.border (Whitaker, 2007). However, a confidential memo from
USDHS dated 20 April 2007 addressed “Dear Texas Homeland
Security Partner” was leaked to the media along with a map
detailing over 153 miles of fencing planned for Texas (McLemore,
2007; Osborne, 2007). Although federal officials claimed the map
was merely a “starting point”, Texas leaders were stunned
(McLemore, 2007). In the words of a county judge, “We felt like
we’d been hit below the belt.They tell us we’ll be consulted, then
we find they’ve carved up the border andwere already going out for
bids” (cited in McLemore, 2007; see also Cortez, 2008).
Amidst a great deal of uncertainty as to where and how walls
would be built in Texas, USDHS initiated protocols established by
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) for seventy miles of
fencing in the Lower Rio Grande Valley. The NEPA is federally
mandated to ensure citizen participation, consider environmental
sustainability and environmental justice, provide safe and healthful
surroundings, and preserve national heritage sites. Throughout the
NEPA process, steadfast opposition by local federal and state offi-
cials as well as grassroots groups like No Border Wall delayed
construction of walls in south Texas. Then, on April Fool’s Day 2008,
USDHS Secretary Chertoff invoked his authority “to waive any legal
requirements that [he], in [his] sole discretion, determine[d]
necessary to ensure expeditious construction of this much-needed
border infrastructure” (USDHS, 2008).
The U.S. Congress granted this authority to the DHS secretary
when it passed the REAL ID Act in 2005. Republican Congressman
James Sensenbrenner claimed the act “is aimed at preventing
another 9/11-type attack by disrupting terrorist travel and
bolstering our border security” (USHRCJ, 2005). During congres-
sional debate, Democratic Congresswoman Sheila Jackson-Lee
shifted attention to the unprecedented authority the act would
grant to DHS (USHRCR, 2005, H459):
To my knowledge, a waiver this broad is unprecedented. It
would waive all laws, including laws protecting civil rights; laws
protecting the health and safety of workers; laws, such as the
Davis-Bacon Act, which are intended to ensure that construction
workers on federally-funded projects are paid the prevailing
wage; environmental laws; and laws respecting sacred burial
grounds.
Jackson-Lee’s comments point to the unprecedented concen-
tration of power given to the executive branch by the REAL ID Act’s
waver provision. The REAL ID Act only allows for redress on the
grounds the constitution has been violated and only at the level of
federal district court (Bowers, 2010). Cases put forward by envi-
ronmental organizations challenging the constitutionality of
Chertoff’s waivers have been dismissed in court and the Supreme
Court has refused to hear any petitions.
The waiver provision has its roots in thwarted attempts to
complete a triple fencing project in San Diego, California in 2004.
Completion of the San Diego wall had continually come up against
environmental regulations, which denied permits to plow through
the Tijuana River National Estuarine Research and Reserve. The
waiver authority granted to USDHS in 2005 allowed Chertoff to
move forward and complete the fence by ensuring that environ-
mental organizations would be unable to use the judicial system to
force the government to comply with its own mandates. In short,
the waiver provision walled off the justice system.
When Chertoff invoked his waiver authority, he waived thirty-
six federal laws, including the NEPA, Clean Water Act, Clean Air
Act, Endangered Species Act, Native American Graves Protection
and Repatriation Act, and Safe Drinking Water Act. Many of these
laws are the result of demands made by social movements. In
waiving NEPA, Chertoff also stripped valley residents of their
political rights to publically consider what it would mean to live
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end up south of the wall? Or the Lipan-Apache community
members whose land was granted by the Spanish Crown in the
1770s; would their land be seized to build the wall? How would
farmers get to their fields, if located south of the wall? Or, what of
the ocelots e small felines e who need to cross the Rio Grande in
search of mates? Chertoff waived away these questions on that
historic day, leaving valley residents with no recourse and no legal
protections.
After the waivers, USDHS to moved forward quickly with wall
construction. In turn, No Border Wall participants initiated the
practice of witnessing the progress (Fig. 2). We watched as
construction crews deconstructed levees in the Lower Rio Grande
River flood control system, leaving valley residents vulnerable to
flooding in the middle of hurricane season; documented
construction sludge being pumped into federally protected stop-
over habitat for migrating waterfowl and nesting habitat for resi-
dent birds; laughed, when we located cat holes in the steel fencing
that allowed ocelots to move through the landscape without
compromising national security.
The waiver authorization is no longer considered a temporary
strategy. Republicans have introduced two Congressional bills that
would make the waiver of laws a permanent feature of the U.S.
borderlands. The National Security and Federal Lands Protection
Act, which the House of Representatives passed in June 2012, will
make sixteen of the thirty-six laws included in Chertoff’s 2008
waiver permanent within all lands under the jurisdiction of the
Departments of the Interior and Agriculture which lay within 100-
miles of U.S. land borders. In a somewhat similar tactic, the
proposed Border Security Enforcement Act of 2011 would prevent
the Departments of the Interior (DOI) and Agriculture fromFig. 2. Witnessing levee border wall construction at Monterrey Banco National
Wildlife Refuge, 2008. Photo courtesy of Wayne Bartholomew.enforcing laws in federally designated areaswithin 150-miles of the
political boundary, if and when the Department of Homeland
Security deems DOI laws to be in conflict with national security
agendas (set by USDHS or the Executive Office).
These proposed bills legitimize and further entrench the notion
of the U.S. borderlands as a “constitution-free zone”, a term that the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) (2008) uses to refer to a 100-
mile strip around the perimeter of the U.S.A. wherein Customs and
Border Protection assumes extraordinary (and unconstitutional)
powers to arbitrarily stop and search people. The ACLU has calcu-
lated that two-thirds of the U.S. population (or 197.4 million people
according to 2007 census data) lives within this constitution-free
zone.
A Texas Legal Aid attorney used the term constitution-free zone
to refer to the state of democracy in the Rio Grande Valley (inter-
view with author, 2008). The widespread waiver power granted to
the executive branch essentially circumvents the checks and
balances built into the democratic system. As the director for
a small wildlife sanctuary in the valley told me in an interview in
2008: “Congress may as well suspend our right to vote here in the
Valley” because “the heart of the democratic process has been cut
out” with USDHS wall building. He explained:
If our elected officials cannot expect their legislative actions to be
respected by the executive branch of government and our ability
to challenge that is essentially limited to the capricious benevo-
lence of the Supreme Court, we’ve pretty much thrown out the
democratic process and the rule of law all in one fell swoop.
In sum, residents (human and nonhuman) of the U.S. border-
lands not only live in a constitution-free zone where constitutional
guarantees are suspended, but the REAL ID Act waiver provision
also means that basic rights such as clean air and water may be
waived at the discretion of the executive branch.
Witnessing these daily practices and contestations of wall
building in south Texas pushed me to consider the implications for
democracy in the U.S. for border studies. The legal mechanisms
used to expedite the construction of U.S. border walls expanded the
executive branch’s capacity to suspend the law in the name of
national security (Bowers, 2010). In the process, the sovereign
power of the executive branch is strengthened in ways that
neutralize the legislative and judicial branches. In contrast to
Brown’s argument, the process of building border walls in the U.S.
suggests a resurgence of sovereignty (Butler, 2006). Such trans-
formations in sovereignty require renewed attention to boundary
making as a technique of power used to reconfigure the state and
its relationship to citizens within the space of the nation.
Strategic confusion: icons and infrastructures of conflict in
IsraelePalestine
Wendy Pullan
Since the first sections of the wall were built in Palestine in
2002, the world’s attention has been galvanized by this structure.
Snaking across the landscape, breached by protestors, and targeted
by conflict tourists, the wall has figured regularly in the media as
the embodiment of the IsraeliePalestinian conflict. At a time when
states increasingly resort to building walls instead of finding more
reasonable means for dealing with disputes, this particular
example has become the most famous since the demise of its
counterpart in Berlin in 1989.
Thewall has become subject to its ownprominent image. In situ,
the wall has been the setting for art installations, films, tourism,
and activist events: by painting on its surface, Banksy and the
Battistas have consolidated their fame, much to the delight of
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Palestinians proclaim their repugnance of it or simply vent their
frustrations in paintings and graffiti. Although it is witnessed in the
flesh by Palestinians, settlers, and activists, most Israelis inside
Israel experience the structure as a media image just like the rest of
the world. As such it is remote, reified, perhaps a little unreal, quick
to provoke anger, or confidence, and just as easy to forget.
More than any commentary on it, the structure of the wall can
take on its own aesthetic quality, potently sculptural in the stark
light and shade of the region. Its own iconicity is central to the
attraction, and in the combination of beauty and horror, it is
tempting to see it as a reinvention of the Sublime, fit for twenty-
first century savagery. The machine aesthetic has been rampant
in theWest for about a century; infrastructures like bridges, cranes,
causeways, motorways e and walls e are used to convey speed,
strength, energy, and fashion, and understood to be part of
Modernism’s visual legacy of transparent functionality and
unabated power. But as with many structures that are more
complicated than the image they initially project, the wall detracts
deceptively from other more important problems, especially long-
term prospects for peace in the region.
Israel continues to claim that the barrier is for security; the
Palestinians have regarded it as a land grab. In the years since its
inception, the structure is more clearly part of a larger program to
dismantle Palestinian East Jerusalem, encourage emigration and
generally restrict Palestine as a state (Dolphin, 2006; Dumper &
Pullan, 2010, pp. 1e16). A conflict infrastructure has been devel-
oped and maintained that includes Israeli civilian settlements andFig. 3. The separation barrier at Jerusalem’s Abu Dis neighborhood, 2008: the political
aesthetics of a contested landscape. Photo courtesy of Conflict in Cities.a segregated road network. The wall is simply the most visible part
of this infrastructure (Fig. 3). Built unilaterally by the Israelis on
Palestinian land, the separation barrier is constructed in non-
populated areas as a 160e330 foot-wide ditch and fence system,
enhanced with cameras, watch towers, razor wire, raked sand, and
a patrol road to allow monitoring through it. In cities, it is a solid
nineteen to twenty-six feet concrete wall with towers and gates to
prevent sniping in civilian crowds (Israel Ministry of Defense,
2012). The wall appears permanent, but is actually are made up
of prefabricated modules that have been dropped into place by
crane without deep foundations; in the same manner that they
have been laid, they can also be extracted. While not to diminish
the present distress caused to Palestinians, or the unpleasant
tendency of such “temporary” structures to endure, it is important
to realize that, as a structure, the wall can come down.
Much of the disruption and suffering caused by the long term
occupation in Palestine has intensified with the Israeli policy of
closure; the wall and checkpoints aid its enforcement, but it is all
part of a historical process of occupation and control in the West
Bank that developed in the immediate period after the 1967 war.
Broad infrastructures constitute it: water, electricity, police and
military control, segregated roads, and most of all, the civilian
enclaves restricted to Jewish inhabitants. In the long term the
settlements, more than themilitary, havemade the occupation, and
they are bound by a complex interdependency of all of the infra-
structural systems. For the settlements, the infrastructures are their
“elixir of life.the secret of their power” (Zertal & Eldar, 2007, p. xv),
without which they could not exist.
Many of the settlements are full-scale suburban towns, with
schools, commercial centers, community halls, and parks. Far from
a pioneering ethos of a few rough caravans on a hilltop, it is their
ambience of middle-class contentment that strikes one: the
possibilities for evacuation are remote. They are permanent,
spoilers for any hope of a long term and just solution. The map of
Jerusalem is particularly revealing (Fig. 4), showing settlements
that house about half of the West Bank Jewish population. Deep
into Palestinian territory is Maale Adumim, with about 40,000
inhabitants, but more disturbingly, E1, the “settlement in waiting”,
stands between Maale Adumim and Jerusalem. As a designated
settlement, the E1 area has undergone massive destruction to the
existing semi-arid landscape in order to equip it with infrastructure
for up to 25,000 people. Divided carriageways, roundabouts, and
bridges wait for vehicles; electricity pylons march out into the
desert; only the buildings (and settlers) are missing due to a freeze
ordered by the US government. If realized, the settlement will
complete the Israeli corridor from Maale Adumim through to Jer-
usalem and divide the northern West Bank from the southern,
destroying the possibilities of a viable Palestinian state (Arieli,
2008).
Across the Jerusalemmap, settlements have been built amongst
the Palestinian villages and suburbs, hemming them in and pre-
venting their ability to grow, and creating their own, Israeli, spatial
contiguity. At the same time, no local roads connect Palestinian and
Israeli neighborhoods; the two peoples gaze at each other across
the valleys, but physical access is denied. It is a bizarre approach to
planning, using one civilian neighborhood to scupper another.
Nearly 30 years ago the initiative was explained to the Jerusalem
Committee, Israeli Mayor Teddy Kollek’s international advisory
body, as a molding of the city “into a greater Jerusalem that is
altering the physical and political character of the region”
(Kroyanker, 1982, p. 27); today we see the results.
Throughout the West Bank, from major highways to minor
connections, a segregated road system exists. Modern, high-speed
motorways, completely lit at night, have been built to connect the
settlements to each other and to the major cities inside Israel. Most
Fig. 4. The conflict infrastructures of greater Jerusalem: wall, settlements, bypass roads. Map produced by Conflict in Cities.
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habitation. The bypass roads skirt and surpass the old existing road
system that has been left for the Palestinians; restricted by check-
points and forbidden roads, the population is regularly forced to
choose slower, more difficult routes, if, in the end, any access is
available to them. Thewall has allowed Israel to take approximately
15e20% of Palestinian land, but restricted access increases this
almost threefold: according to a World Bank report (2007), the
segregated road system denies access to 50% of the West Bank to
Palestinians. Converting a transport system, that under the British
and Jordanians was constructed to follow the natural and built
topography and connect all areas of population, to one that is
formed by political expediencies to separate certain groups of
population, has unsurprisingly resulted in a tangled confusion,
relieved only by the liberal use of expensive causeways, bridges,
and tunnels. Moreover, none of the restrictions, nor the overall road
policy, has been stated or legislated; they are a “collection of
undeclared measures that together form a single, undeclared
policy” (Lein, 2004, p. 35), enforced ad hoc by soldiers as they see
fit. The bypass roads have helped to make the spacious homes and
gardens of the settlements convenient and secure for Israelis,
whose domestic opportunism may be stronger than their political
ideologies. But perhaps most worryingly, history shows that major
road systems are usually the most enduring and powerful human
artifacts in any landscape. Roman roads still order their respective
terrain, and so will the segregated transport systems continue to
dominate the West Bank topography, configuring it well into the
future, long after the demise of the wall. B’Tselem, the Israeli
Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories,
states that “the vast majority of the roads that Israel has built in the
West Bank is to strengthen its control over the land” (cited in Lein,
2004, p. 9). Mobility, and its patterns of restriction and confiscation,
has become key to the spatial structure of the occupation (Pullan,
2007).
In the West Bank, commonsense planning for everyday life has
been sabotaged in favor of complex infrastructural systems that
support the occupation. As Minister of Housing in 1992, Ariel
Sharon boasted that his aim was to scatter settlements and roads
to create a “logic of disorder”, and in this way prevent a tidyrelinquishing of territory and return to the Green Line (Zertal &
Eldar, 2007, p. 100). This has now become an extensive strategy,
dependent upon a number of Kafkaesque scenarios which help to
promote the status and well-being of one national group over
another; in effect, the West Bank has been recreated as an absurd
stage upon which only the settlers are party to the play and its
props. Planning is regularly countered by anti-planning to form
a state of strategic confusion. It is probably worth noting that such
a system is promulgated by a nation that has never had officially
recognized borders, and has always used such fluid and uncertain
conditions to its own advantage; even before the 1967 war,
proposals for a security fence were rejected precisely because
such an installation might confirm inconvenient or undesired
political facts (Segev, 2007, pp. 206e207). More recently, we see
the same policy of strategic confusion: in the 1990s, the Oslo
peace process was sold with a slogan that promoted the two state
solution, “we are here and they are there”. But subsequent facts
on the ground have been made to resist such clear divisions, and
the Israeli Minister of Public Security (later Minister of National
Infrastructures), Uzi Landau, claimed: “they are there, but we are
here, and there as well” (cited in Foundation for Middle East
Peace, 2002).
The ambivalent nature of borders (Johnson et al., 2011) is
conducive to supporting strategic confusion. At the same time,
a relatively silent conflict infrastructural program functions
effectively in the background, as planned and implemented by
a sovereign state. The wall appears as a hard separation and, in
keeping with the key characteristics of iconic structures (Sklair,
2011), it remains bold and easy to recognize. With this image
comes the assumption that the wall alone has substantially altered
the terms of the occupation. Yet, the conjecture is mostly subter-
fuge, for the separation barrier is just one part of a long-term
system. After all, this massively imposing structure divides only
Palestinians from each other. Most significantly, the wall, which
seems so well-defined in the image it projects, masks utterly
confusing and deceptive conditions on the ground; together they
are two sides of the same coin. As the system of strategic confu-
sion in total becomes increasingly more entrenched, it should be
attracting attention. For without properly addressing the whole
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the required critical difference.From intractable conflict to transformative knowledge: the
Home for Co-operation in Cyprus
Charis Psaltis, Chara Makriyianni, Rana Zincir Celal, Meltem
Onurkan Samani
On 6 May 2011, near an open checkpoint along the 180-km
patrolled United Nations (UN) Buffer Zone of Cyprus, a new polit-
ical “third space” was launched. Leaders of Greek Cypriot and
Turkish Cypriot communities, with the bicommunal grassroots
initiative Association for Historical Dialogue and Research (AHDR),
inaugurated the Home for Co-operation (H4C), an “infrastructure of
peace” intended to turn a “dead zone into a zone of co-operation”
(Makriyianni & Onurkan Samani, 2011). Fig. 5 illustrates more than
a celebration of political “neutrality” at a site of former division: it
depicts an initiative that results from the states of exception that
constitute Cyprus and the spatial practices of Cypriots who seek to
overcome the legacies of a violent and costly “intractable conflict”
(Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005; Kriesberg, 1998). The establishment of
the H4C offers a model for scholars and activists in other divided
contexts in at least three ways: by challenging states of exception,
dismantling division through transformative knowledge, and
creating safe spaces of encounter.
First, internationally condoned systems of states of exception
need to be identified as unhealthy for any democracy. States of
exception support each other and become normalized over time; in
Cyprus, such a system has prevented resolution to conflict and
division at multiple scales (Constantinou, 2008). In 1960, the
fledgling democratic state of Cyprus was created following agree-
ments between Greece, Turkey, and the UK, rather than from the
will of Cypriots. After 1964, the Republic of Cyprus became a Greek
Cypriot-run state and many Turkish Cypriot people were displaced.
After 1974, the Turkish army forcedmassive displacements of Greek
Cypriots, which was accompanied by the suspension of property
rights for many people under the suspension of law as part of the
“doctrine of necessity” in the Republic of Cyprus (Trimikliniotis,
2010). The UK military bases in Cyprus are legally not part of the
EU or the UK, but are considered “sovereign”. The establishment of
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 1983, a self-
declared state internationally recognized only by Turkey, is
another state of exception. Finally, the Buffer Zone/Green Line areaFig. 5. Home for Co-operation inaugurationwith Dr. Chara Makriyianni, Association for
Historical Dialogue and Research (AHDR) President; Turkish Cypriot leader Dr. Dervis¸
Eroglu; Greek Cypriot leader Dr. Dimitris Christofias; Dr. Meltem Onurkan Samani,
AHDR Vice-President. Nicosia, Cyprus, 6 May 2011. Photo courtesy of AHDR.is controlled by the UN and marks their longest peacekeeping
mission (UNFICYP, 2012). The Green Line reinforced existing
political barriers within the walls of old Nicosia e along the fence
that appeared during the 1955e1959 National Organization of
Cypriot Fighters’ struggle for union with Greece e rather than
diffuse conflict. In the context of recent international negotiations
over the island’s status that continue to result in political stale-
mates, one wonders if this “peacekeeping measure” does more to
perpetuate the status quo than to create possibilities for peace.
Conflicts are always physical and symbolic, transmitted across
generations. Through time, citizens become accustomed to
different societies whereby social representations of the Other
reinforce fear, prejudice and, eventually, mistrust. This is true even
after physical borders become penetrable, such as whenmovement
was permitted at several crossings along the Green Line in 2003.
Indeed, in response to checkpoint openings, a “resurgent sover-
eignty” (Butler, 2006) emerged when the Republic of Cyprus joined
the EU as a Greek Cypriot run state. Greek Cypriot nationalist and
communitarian/patriotic positions often argue that the checkpoints
should close again because the movement of people to the north
“supports the Turkish occupation” financially and ethically (cited in
Psaltis, 2011). Intergroup contact between members of the two
communities was strategically moralized by the 2003e2008 Greek
Cypriot leadership (Demetriou, 2007), resulting in the reduction of
crossings to the north by Greek Cypriots. Similar calls by the
Turkish Cypriot administration to support only Turkish Cypriot
financial institutions further inhibit the possibilities of trade and
shared economic markets.
Claims related to displacement, restrictions on political identity
through aggressive discourses, and the ongoing presence of mili-
tary personnel demonstrate that longer-standing forms of intrac-
table conflict continue to be part of everyday life for most Cypriots,
including in places that one might expect alternatives to exist, such
as formerly mixed villages (Lytras & Psaltis, 2011) or in educational
institutions (Psaltis, Lytras, & Costache, 2011). Such examples point
to the underlying material, political, and symbolic threats that stem
from the possibility of upsetting a “normal” system based upon
states of exception. Multiple generations remain alienated from life
on the other side of the divide and create survival mechanisms to
navigate segregated spaces (Constantinou, 2008). Nationalist
narratives, and international and “sovereign” systems of exception
hinder the cognitive and moral development of younger genera-
tions by suppressing social relations of mutual respect that are
needed for the construction of knowledge and critical thinking
(Psaltis, Duveen, & Perret-Clermont, 2009).
Second, division and isolation must be dismantled simulta-
neously through what the AHDR calls “transformative knowledge”.
Existing official narratives and representations of space that
alienate members of all communities must be identified and
deconstructed. For example, distinct ideological positions about
resolving “the Cyprus problem” orient the social psychological
subject in the past, present, and future (Psaltis, 2011). Greek and
Turkish Cypriot nationalisms are supported by historical narratives
of continuity with the Greek and Turkish nations respectively;
national spatial imaginaries depict Cyprus as part of the map of
Greece or Turkey (Papadakis, 2008), or, for the latter, as divided
with the northern part of the island (colored red onmaps to refer to
Turkey). After 1974, whereas Turkish Cypriot nationalists continued
to aspire toward taksim (separation and possible union with
Turkey), Greek Cypriots reoriented their policies toward the
reunification of Cyprus, abandoning enosis (union with Greece).
New forms of subjectivation appeared. A banal Greek Cypriot
national identity (after Billig, 1995) projects communal identifica-
tion to the superordinate category of “Cypriot”. Not long ago, the
cover of school exercise books was a bleeding Cyprus injured by the
Fig. 6. Barricade in the “no man’s land”: Nicosia, Cyprus, 1964. Photo courtesy of Sten
Boye Poulsen.
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troops e an image familiar to a whole generation of Greek Cypriots.
A new Turkish Cypriot identity known as “Kibrisli Turk” has also
emerged that overidentifies with the TRNC to assert an identity of
being neither simply Turkish nor Cypriot.
In contrast, when ideological and spatial routines that reinforce
division are deconstructed, creating safe spaces of exchange can be
explored. This is the third process needed to create infrastructures
of peace. Human rights groups and civil society organizations have
led the way in creating neutral spaces of encounter in at least two
ways: by working at multiple scales to overcome division, and by
using the gaps and inconsistencies of “borders” for peaceful
purposes.
From 1964 to 2003, bi-communal peace initiatives included
island- and diaspora-based Turkish and Greek Cypriots, academics,
and diplomats, all of whom were committed to conflict resolution
(Broome, 1998; Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, 1993). NGOs, peace
research institutes, and private initiatives acted with the funding
support of national governments, the EU, or the UN. International
agencies, such as the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment (IBRD), and the World Health Organization (WHO), also
facilitated bicommunal meetings in pursuit of the objectives of
their mandates (Hocknell, 2001; Loizos, 2006). The 2003 openings
offered Cypriots the possibility toworkmore freely on bi- and inter-
communal endeavors; projects now exist related to gender
equality, environmentalism, and historical education.
Joint projects across the divide, however, are still viewed with
suspicion, are often considered inconsequential, and are difficult to
fund. Limited social infrastructures, with restrictions onmovement,
prevent broader political support and public interest. Civil society
initiatives thus have strategically developed contacts at multiple
scales to establish temporary or semi-permanent alternative spaces
of encounter. For example, the AHDR, established by historians,
educators, social psychologists, and activists in 2003, uses its
networks on both sides of the divide and internationally to offer
inter-communal history teaching training programs, provide
alternative educational materials, and create dialogue-based
knowledge constructed through exchanges between Greek,
Turkish, Armenian, Maronite, and Latini/Latin (of Roman-Catholic
background) Cypriot citizens. AHDR projects are organized both
independently and with the support of local and European orga-
nizations, including the Council of Europe, EUROCLIO and teacher
trade unions across the divide. Similarly, other organizations obtain
support from the Civil Affairs Section of the UN Peace Keeping
Mission in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the UN Development Program.
The UNFICYP also encourages civilian uses of the Buffer Zone
through agricultural work, maintenance of public utilities and
communications, and the construction of commercial and resi-
dential buildings.
The spatial gaps in borders, including so-called open borders,
have also been used strategically by human rights organizations
and NGOs. In Nicosia, individuals involved in civil society activities
after 2003 physically moved along a main street that connected
north and south, and went through venues in border zones oper-
ated by international actors: the UN at the Ledra Palace Hotel, the
US at the Fulbright Center, and Germany at the Goethe Institute.
The AHDR realized this emerging “non-terrain”, in part created by
what Dowler describes in her Intervention as “open doors inwalls”,
could offer a setting for Cypriots to explore diverse alternatives and
models in education, the arts, community programming, and the
media. However, purchasing and refurbishing a deserted building
in the former “no man’s land”, and transforming it into the “home”
of a new radical imaginary e even with open doors e required
“scale negotiating” strategies. To maintain the symbolic neutralityof a “third space”, AHDR sought financial support from funders
across the divide and from international actors (embassies of
foreign countries supporting rapprochement; teacher trade unions
pursuing bi-communal work). The resources needed for the project
also required EEA financial mechanisms to fund and channel
international grants through the planning bureaucracies of the
Republic of Cyprus. The AHDRwas thus able to acquire a building in
2010 through a multi-scaled network of Cypriot activists, interna-
tional political and financial donors, the UNDP, and private indi-
viduals and organizations.
The possibility for such spatial practices to congeal was also
a result of the very tangible legacies of a divided city. This house
stood empty for more than 30 years in the UN Buffer Zone. Origi-
nally constructed in the early 1950s by the Armenian Mangoian
Brothers and once surrounded by historic monuments, including
French Lusignian and Venetian walls, Islamic structures, and an
Armenian monastery and cemetery, this building stood in a neigh-
borhood with Armenian, Greek, and Turkish Cypriots homes and
enterprises, including Cyprus’s leading hotel, the “Ledra Palace”
(Epaminondas, 2011). By the 1960s, cohabitation across this main
artery of the city was replaced by barricades and security forces,
creating abandoned buildings and gardens (Fig. 6).
The H4C concentrates symbolic meanings of co-operation by
putting infrastructures of peace into practice. The geographical
and historical context of the H4C e a historical multi-communal,
multi-functional area where commercial and residential life was
tightly interwoven, located in a buffer zone of intractable conflict,
where separate communities now meet in a safe space e physi-
cally embodies a viable “third space” and may offer a model for
other divided societies. Claiming a part of Nicosia considered as
“dead” and transforming it into a forum of contact and uncon-
strained, decentered dialogue between all communities means to
question those normalization narratives implicit to nationalist
histories, as well as claims tied to states of exception and division
in Cyprus (Makriyianni & Psaltis, 2007). It means to acknowledge
the needs and fears of all communities, and to interrogate
dominant narratives of victimization through research. Inter-
group contact is instrumental in overcoming conflict as it facili-
tates the decrease of realistic and symbolic threats, anxiety, and
negative stereotypes for the other community (Allport, 1954;
Tausch et al., 2010). In the case of the H4C, it is also a unique
means of achieving academic excellence in teaching history.
Although the H4C does not have ability to completely overcome
systemic states of exception or division, it does offer citizens
a safe space to imagine a different Cyprus through transformative
knowledge.
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Lorraine Dowler
“Only the Irish can build a wall of this great size and put a door
in it!” This was a customary anecdote of Tom Hartley, a Sinn Fein
councilor, historian and later Lord Mayor of Belfast, as he guided
political tours of the peacewalls along the Falls Road inWest Belfast
(August 2005 tour). Hartley, in his good-humored way, excavated
spaces of commonality or cracks between what had mostly been
viewed as two divided rival communities: Irish Catholics and
British Protestants. Keeping Hartley’s words in mind, I propose that
political walls not only divide: in the case of Belfast they are
selectively permeable, forming a borderland, not only for former
enemies but also for political tourists, not only from across the
world but from within the city.
Due to international interest in the peace process, formal tourism
has been on the rise inNorthern Ireland, leading to the development
of rival tourism initiatives by both the state and local communities,
with each offering their explanation(s) for the conflict. As was the
casewhenbarriers inWest Belfastwerefirst built, both theCatholics
and the British government are once again drawing “parallel lines”
in the sand; however the battle is not so much a question of the
legitimacy of the opposing force’s ability to protect this area, it is
now about controlling tourist representations of the conflict. What
seems critical to the West Belfast tourism initiative is that the
conflict remains intact in the symbolic realm, with peace lines
standing as cultural traces of Irish resistance to the British State. In
the context of the borderlands of West Belfast, both new and old
doors seem to remain ajar in these supposedly solid political walls
allowing for a variety of interactions across these divides.
The building of walls in Northern Ireland does not easily fit
representationsbythepopularmedia thatdepictwallsas spectacular
statements of power struggles between nations. The proliferation of
peace walls can be read as symptoms of what Brown (2010) calls
“waning sovereignty,” under which local communities challenge
notions of dominion inways that are representative of multiple and
individualizing political discourses. Brown’s argument points to an
irony, whereby the building of spectacular political divides on the
landscapemight at first glance represent the supremacy of the state
in its ability to restrain the movement of certain groups. Still, as
Brown suggests, these very same walls indicate the vulnerability of
the state as they represent “dubiousness, or instability at the core of
what they aim to expressdqualities that are themselves antithetical
to sovereignty and thus elements of its undoing” (24).
The walls of Belfast to some extent challenge Brown’s line of
reasoning as they represent a more nuanced understanding of
place-driven understandings of sovereignty. First, the construction
of the first peace-line in Belfast in 1969 was in direct opposition to
the erection of state walls. The first peace-line not only controlled
the movement of Protestant vigilante groups but also the move-
ment of the state, both physically, in terms of who would have
access to the Catholic areas, and politically, in terms of agency for
the Irish Catholic community in West Belfast. Second, unlike
Brown’s interpretations of the more recent erections of walls in
Israel, Mexico, Morocco, andMozambique, in Belfast the state is one
of several actors that participate in localized power struggles with
a democratic government that argues it “protects” its minority
population by controlling mobility in and out of the area. Third,
walls not only divide; they are also discriminatingly porous. Walls
are part of a larger borderlands defined by the shared cultural,
economic, and political contexts of an area. The concept of the
borderland transcends rigid notions of cartographic borders,
cultural markers, or physical divides (Kaplan & Häkli, 2002; Sahlins,
1989). In the case of Northern Ireland, Nagle (2009) promotes“exploiting the cracks” in the borderlands whereby a marginalized
ethnic group can utilize “partial openings” to challenge govern-
ment’s self-representation as democratic (p. 135).
At first glance, the presence of the peace line performs national
allegiances between two rival neighborhoods. Such markers of
territoriality e walls, political murals, festivals, and marches e are
easy photo opportunities for journalists who contribute to the
production of such spectacles. However, even a brief history of the
peace lines and temporary barriers indicates the complex nature of
the nation building process that is continually complicated by
issues of gender, ethnicity, class, race, and sexuality.
In the late summer of 1969 the British Army moved against
Catholic and Protestant vigilante groups that were terrorizing areas
of Belfast. The army was called in after communal violence had
claimed a number of lives in the area. They occupied strategic
positions of the Falls Road Area (Catholic stronghold) and imme-
diately began erecting barbed wire fences separating the opposing
communities (Lee, 1969). Little did these soldiers know that this
temporary dividewould give birth to a new type of “barrier design”,
a design that would later be promoted by urban planners as
providing safety through separation, which is comparable to what
Pullan writes in her Intervention.
Unfortunately, this first divide would be the beginning of
decades of isolation and self-governing for this Catholic commu-
nity. By October 1969 Belfast had become a divided city, with the
Catholic community ensconced within its own self-made barri-
cades that sealed-off more than 90 small streets where Catholic
families feared an attack by Protestant forces (Special to the New
York Times, 1969). Eventually the Catholic barriers yielded to the
state barrier as General Freeland pronounced to an international
audience: “The peace line will be a very, very temporary affair. We
will not have a Berlin Wall or anything like that in this city”
(Harding, 2004). Yet the walls of Belfast remain standing more than
40 years later. There are officially 84 peace lines in Northern Ireland
separating Catholic from Protestant communities and 42 of these
partitions are scattered in theWest, North and South of Belfast City.
Many of these barriers were recently refortified and it is estimated
that the numbers of barriers have tripled since the signing of the
1994 ceasefire (Geoghegan, 2010).
Groups situated on different sides of a divide often mirror
each other due to the shared militarized politics of the common
borderlands (Minghi, 2002). Despite the presence of the peace
walls, West Belfast can be considered a borderland constituted by
everyday expressions of commonality. An obvious case of the
political penetrability of these walls was through the Nobel Peace
Prize, awarded in 1976 to Betty Williams, a Protestant, and
Mairead Corrigan, a Catholic, who both organized peace
demonstrations that brought together Catholics and Protestants
to protest violent acts by British soldiers, the IRA, and Protestant
paramilitary groups. Other less celebrated examples of the
permeability of this divide originate in the gendered politics
common to both communities. Historically, in West Belfast,
women, at least in the popular imagination, were associated
more with the home than politics. Accordingly they enjoyed
a greater spatial mobility that allowed them to cross these
divides to visit the shops on the Shankill Road or the medical
clinic. As Tom Hartley would quip to tourists, “the doors in these
walls allow the grannies to do their messages” (August 2005
tour). In contrast, (male) taxi drivers were considered the wild-
men of West Belfast and tainted as bad nationalists because
they continually crossed the peace lines of West Belfast, often
shuffling a younger generation of residents who were courting
across the religious divide. These two respective groups, however,
would not be considered political subjects to a global theater, as
would the IRA volunteer, the Protestant paramilitary, or the
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boundary lines of West Belfast, but also those of a nation viewed
by a global audience as the embodiment of an intractable conflict.
Many of the women who once crossed over the peace line now
shop in new stores in the city center and several of the men who
were critical of taxi drivers for crossing the peace lines more than
ten years ago have since become taxi drivers themselves, even
offering specialized tours for those travelers who want to see the
“hot spots” of West Belfast including the peace line (Dowler,
2001).
Although the peace lines as dividing barriers have grown d in
number, height and breadthdmore recently, they also provide the
material framing for a local community festival in the Irish
Nationalist area of West Belfast. Established in 1988, the Féile an
Phobail, known locally as “the people’s festival”, was a direct
response to the local media’s designation of this area as a “terrorist
community” (O’Hare, 2009). The residents felt this portrayal was
more restrictive than the physical walls that cordoned them off, and
they organized a celebration of their community’s creativity,
energy, and passion for the arts. Féile an Phobail has grown into one
of the largest community festivals in Europe and provides a plat-
form for the people of West Belfast to literally tell their “war
stories”. The festival’s organization, exchanges, story-telling, and
responses offer residents a political dialogue within the Irish
Nationalist community, with other Belfast communities, and with
the international community. In this case, the walls of Belfast not
only represent a divided past, but also a new means of political
expression.
Local stores carry books featuring arty black andwhite images of
the various peace lines for tourists to put on their coffee tables back
home. The political murals that once promoted the IRA and anti-
British sentiment are fewer in number, as murals now encourage
international solidarity by variously highlighting the victimization
of the Palestinians, promoting Basque separatism, or denouncing
international tyranny, such as themural of former President George
W.Bush siphoningoil outof Iraq; these are showcasedona sectionof
the Peace Line now referred to as the “InternationalWall”. Whereas
the local tourism initiative in West Belfast reproduces the territori-
ality of the peace line to make a profit, it also has potential to build
cross-line relationships. Illustrative of such cooperation is a tour run
by a former Catholic prisoners group. The tour guide, a former
prisoner and IRA volunteer, walks tourists up and down the Falls
Road, explaining the history behind the murals and telling personal
stories of life in prison. The tour often consists of Europeans,
Americans, and Australians. With middle-class Protestant British
couples, he tells stories of life in Long Kesh Prison and IRAmissions,
punctuatingexplanations forhis actionswithphrases such as “itwas
the times”, or explaining how he once refused a mission, breaking
ranks with the IRA, because it was potentially too dangerous to
bystanders, including Protestants. The tour also includes “a pint” at
a local Irish pubwith the guide. This guide seeks approval by tourists
by presenting himself as an individual, with the agency to make
ethical decisions, but, more importantly, he wants to create West
Belfast as a welcoming place for middle-class Protestants.
The guide walks some tourists across the divide and drops
them off on the Shankill Road with a former UVF volunteer and
the tour continues. It seems unfathomable that a former prisoner
would feel comfortable crossing the peace line, but as he
explained, “it is ok when you are with the tourists but under no
circumstances would I walk over there alone” (August 2010
interview). He then smiled and stated, “you know the IRA tour is
so much better than the UVF’s”, adding, “at least that is what the
tourists have been telling us”. In this new borderlands, commu-
nities, rather than the state, now vie for control of the symbolic
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